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Community Monitoring and Evaluation: A Case Study of Takaful and Karama

I. Executive Summary
In accordance with the Egyptian government’s agenda for economic reforms
that started in 2014, the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MoSS) implemented the
Takaful and Karama program with support from the World Bank. The program
aims to enhance social protection and alleviate poverty for the poorest and
marginalized citizens through conditional and non-conditional cash transfers.
In order to maintain a sense of public oversight and local accountability
necessary for program improvement, MoSS launched voluntary community-based
monitoring committees. The committees were formed with the aim of engaging
local communities in ensuring the transparency of efficient resource management,
monitoring the quality of services and accountability of groups that violate the
rules of social justice. Currently, there are around 2600 committees formed in
different areas that were able to uncover the unreported sources of income of
beneficiaries and alter the behavior of some community members which was a
success for the ministry. Therefore, it has become a priority for the ministry to
improve the work of the committees and resolve their inefficiencies.
The work of the committees has not been an easy ride. Committee members are
faced with a number of challenges, a main reason for which is poor community
engagement and acceptance. Communication is weak between the program
and community members, so many of them do not understand the program,
its target beneficiaries, or eligibility and selection criteria. Because of this poor
communication and exclusion of those who do not fulfill the criteria, tension
and distrust are on the rise between committee members and program beneficiaries.
Such tension gets violent sometimes when beneficiaries get excluded for no
longer fulfilling the eligibility criteria. Thus they physically attack committee
members for reporting them or unjustly excluding them from the program. This
in turn negatively affects the program as it hinders the processes of data gathering
for reviewing the applications of beneficiaries.
This paper discusses in particular the potential strategies for increasing
community engagement and acceptance of the committees and enhancing
their results. Based on the case studies and interviews with ministry officials
and community monitors, policy alternatives were formulated to guarantee a
better achievement of the program goals. These alternatives are: a) changing
committee structures to include a percentage of elected members, b) building
the capacity of committees and providing them with clear guidelines, and c)
expanding the scope of committees to include monitoring service provision and
tailoring the program to each area in which it has been implemented. The study
recommends expanding the scope of committees to ensure adequate access to
quality health and education services, enhance community engagement and
acceptance of the committees, and improve program targeting.
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II. Problem Statement
Program Overview
Cash Transfer Programs are programs that support the poorest segments in a
country through providing them with conditional cash transfers. The conditions
that are most common in most countries are related to education, such as
school attendance and scores and health, such as the children receiving
the required vaccinations and nutrition needs. These programs are prevalent
in Latin America such as Bolsa Familia in Brazil and Oportunidades in Mexico
covering millions of beneficiaries (World Bank, 2019). Also, there are large
CCT programs in Turkey, Morocco, Bangladesh and Cambodia. CCTs have the
objective of reducing intergenerational poverty and increasing the education
and health prospects to the poorest segments of society.
Takaful and Karama is a social protection scheme initiated by the Egyptian
government as part of the economic reforms that started in 2014. The program
was implemented in Egypt in 2015 by the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MoSS)
as a conditional and non-conditional cash transfer program that targets the
poorest and marginalized people across the country. The program was among
Egypt’s largest investments in human capital development with the support of
a 400 million US$ World Bank program.
Takaful, or Solidarity is an income support program that targets families to
reduce poverty, encourage children’s schooling, nutrition and access to
healthcare services. The Takaful program is conditional as the households
receive a monthly transfer of 325 EGP, the program targets families who have
children ages 0-18 with maximum 3 children. Each household receives
additional cash of 60 EGP for every 0-6 year-old-child, 80 EGP for the primary
student, 100 EGP for the preparatory student and 140 EGP for the secondary
student. The program entails commitments to families regarding health and
nutrition as it includes four visits per year to health clinics to maintain child
growth records and enhance the awareness of women on better child feeding
practices, immunization, and antenatal and postnatal care. The program aims
to maintain at least 80% school attendance records as well (Takaful and Karama
Official Website, 2019).
Karama, or Dignity, is a social inclusion program that targets the elderly poor
above 65 years old or people with severe disabilities and diseases or orphans.
Karama program is unconditional as vulnerable citizens receive 450 EGP
monthly with no conditions. The eligibility for Karama is assessed through
disability model that was developed not only on a medical approach model but
also a right-based approach. Karama is designed to provide its beneficiaries
with a decent life and social protection (Takaful and Karama Official Website,
2019)
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Program Achievements
An impact evaluation report on Takaful and Karama program was published in
2018 by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in collaboration
with the World Bank and MoSS has proved that Takaful has significantly
increased the household consumption of the poor by between 7.3 and 8.4
percent compared to the non-beneficiaries. It has significantly reduced the
probability of beneficiaries living in global poverty by about 11 percent and
the beneficiary households which live under the regional poverty by 8 percent
(IFPRI, 2018). Yet in the face of skyrocketing prices and increasing inflation
rates, the amount given to beneficiaries is not sufficient to raise them above the
global poverty line at $2 per day on its own. As for its impact on the national
poverty rate, the change is insignificant as the program covers only a small
fraction of poor citizens. In addition, Takaful beneficiaries increased their food
consumption from 8.3 to 8.9 percent. Their children nutrition status
was enhanced as represented in the increase of the average weight-for-height
z-scores and the decrease in the prevalence of malnutrition treatment. The program,
however, has no effect on school enrollment or healthcare utilization as there
was no significant increase in the number of school enrollments among children
or in private tutoring. Moreover, there was no enhancement in the healthcare
services whether for pregnant women to receive the antenatal care or postnatal
care (IFPRI, 2018).
The World Bank has declared in 2018 that Takaful program covers approximately 87
percent of the total program household while Karama program covers around
13 percent of the household beneficiaries. The percentage of women enrolled
in Takaful and Karama program was around 88 percent which exceeds the
representation of men who account for 12 percent.

Major Challenges
Although the targeting efficiency of the program was satisfying to the program
goals, there were two major challenges. First, there was a number of households
in the highest quintile that were accepted into the program due to some reasons
including the undocumented income of applicants (IFPRI, 2018). As noted by
Zaki (2017), applicants sometimes use unsubstantiated documents to apply to
the program and meet the eligibility criteria. For example, although they live in
family houses, they ask their fathers or fathers-in-law to write them a rent contract
so they can apply. In one case, a program beneficiary confessed that when a
field researcher went to his house to investigate his eligibility, he deliberately
took him to another apartment so he would not see the electronic appliances
in his possession and thus be disqualified. The second challenge was that a
large share of the poor remains uncovered by the program especially people who
receive other government pensions, or have a government job or were excluded
from the program due to other factors. This shows that the program is facing
many inclusion and exclusion issues due to the lack of information that need to
be addressed (IFPRI, 2018).
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Past Policies Tried to Address the Problem
Takaful and Karama tried implementing different monitoring mechanisms earlier
to decrease the inclusion and exclusion flawed criteria of the program. These
mechanisms included allowing beneficiaries to report whether they wanted to
be included in the program or to report that an undeserving beneficiary is
taking the grant on the official Facebook page, however that was not effective
as the Facebook page needed maintenance and many of the beneficiaries were
illiterate, so they did not know how to use that method. Another mechanism
that was used was opening a window for customers to air their concerns in the
ministry. It was not effective as the Takaful and Karama Program covers all the
governorates of Egypt. The beneficiary who wants to file a report or complain
has to travel all the way to the Ministry in Giza bearing all the transportation
costs. In addition, the ministry tried to open reporting windows at the different
directorates to tackle the geographical problem mentioned above but this method
was very time-consuming and bureaucratic. Also, many citizens do not have
updated documents so they are disqualified from the programs though they
were qualified for the benefits (Program manager interview, 2019).

International Conditional Cash Transfer Programs
In a World Bank Report analyzing the different models of Cash Transfer programs
in different countries, many themes seem to emerge among the programs in
different countries. There is a major challenge in selecting the right conditions:
which indicators really have a positive impact on the living conditions for the
beneficiaries? For example, does increasing school attendance have a higher
impact on the children’s education? Hence, each country needs to select the
right conditions that have a higher impact on the wellbeing of the beneficiaries.
(Fiszbein, 2009).
Furthermore, a very important aspect to consider in cash transfer programs,
is the fact that general larger cash transfers resulted in larger poverty reduction and better consumption, as impact evaluations of different countries have
proved (Das, 2005).
CCT Programs have different characteristics and objectives according to each
country. For example, BOLSA Familia in Brazil covers 11 million beneficiaries
all over Brazil while other programs such as Chile only targets 215000 in a
specific geographical area (Hobbs, 2007).
There are various targeting mechanisms used by different programs. The most
common targeting techniques are geographical targeting and household targeting via proxy testing or community-based targeting. The formula for the proxy
means test was derived from the statistical analysis of a household survey data
set; the database developed is not used only for the Cash Transfer Program but
is used by other governmental programs as well (Paulino, nd).
As for monitoring the compliance to the program’s conditions, in most countries
the school or health center reports to the program’s management or in some countries

7

Community Monitoring and Evaluation: A Case Study of Takaful and Karama

such as Colombia the beneficiaries themselves need to submit stamped forms
from different services to the ministry. However, getting accurate information is
not an easy step and many programs need a few years to reach a high percentage
of accuracy. Moreover,as some school administrations are hesitant to do
more paperwork or report on absences. Finally, monitoring the conditions and
targeting takes around 4 to 12 percent of the total program costs in order to be
effective (Grosh, 2008).
In many international programs, the CCT programs do not work alone, but they
do partnerships with different ministries or NGOs to increase or develop the
services provided to their target group. In El Salvador, the program did many
partnerships with different NGOs to increase the health services provided to
the beneficiaries. Other models include waivers to school fees or discounts on
health services as in the case of Jamaica. They also have a case management
system in place in which the social workers can refer the families to other services such as job training or job matching (Maxine, 2016).
Many cash assistance programs in different countries have implemented
monitoring mechanisms to reduce the inclusion and exclusion by mistake. For
example, Bolsa Famila, the biggest cash transfer program in Brazil, use a unified
database in which each citizen has a unique social number that is connected
to all of his/her benefits and assets (Hobbs, 2007).
Data Collection
and Entry

•
•
•
•

Municipalties:
Collect Data
Enter Data
Some- CrossChecks

Database
Consollidation
and
Management

Eligibilty
Determinationa
and Verfication

BFF Beneficiaty
Payroll

• Caixa
Economica
Federal
• Consolidates
Data
• Assigns
Identification
Numbers
• Runs Cross
Checks

• Ministry of
Social
• Development
• Verfies
Information
internally and
externally
• Estbalishes
Eligibilty ffor
BFP Payroll

• Includes
families that
have been
deemed eligible
• Program
monitoring

(Hobbs, World Bank, 2017)

In order to reach the poor, they use different communication tools to reach the
ultra-poor through the municipality, family social assistance centers, schools,
local health centers, churches, and NGOs, as well as on television, radio and
through other media.
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The Scope of the Problem
In the Impact Evaluation conducted by IFPRI stated that although 93% of the
beneficiaries were satisfied with the program and disbursement methods some
citizens complained about a poor understanding of the program eligibility criteria.
For example, some citizens expressed their concerns about why their neighbors
who are richer than them got accepted in the program and they did not.
The citizens also expressed their concerns that some of the staff in the ministry
were impartial in processing all the forms. Moreover, the report highlighted that
a large proportion of the poor are not benefiting from the program only 20 percent
of households in the poorest quintile are receiving Takaful transfers.
This is because the poorest citizens did not know how to apply for the program
(El Didi et al., 2018). The same opinion was echoed by Zaki (2017) whose
research indicated that there is a poor communication between the government
and beneficiaries, as the rules are not properly communicated to community
members. In some cases, beneficiaries are not even aware of the amount they
should receive or for how long they will receive it. The main recommendations
provided by IFPRI were to improve the outreach to the poorest communities and
to increase the transparency on beneficiary selection. This shows that there are
poor communication links between the beneficiaries and the ministry and that
beneficiaries need more awareness about the program (El Didi et al., 2018).

The Legal, Social, Economic and Political Contexts
Understanding the context provides a clearer image of the problem, its scope
and impact. For example, Takafol and Karama is an essential program for the
government as it has great political effects. It increases the stability of the
country in lieu of the removal of the gas subsidies, for example. In addition, the
social structure of the Egyptian society which respects cohesion and helps the
less fortunate, makes the program accepted by all segments of society.
Political Context: the government is trying to reach the poorest segments of
society in order to increase the stability in the country and prevent any demonstrations
from increasing the prices and the increased cost of living. Takafol and Karama
ensures that the poorest segment receives the support it needs.
Social Context: properly targeted cash assistance programs increase the social
cohesion between different segments of society. Also, cash assistance programs
targeting women empowers them to have the ability to make decisions within
the household.
Economic Context: properly targeted cash assistance programs decrease the
number of people living in poverty, raise the human investment and thus
increase the workforce in the near future and increase the country’s productivity.

9

Community Monitoring and Evaluation: A Case Study of Takaful and Karama

Problem within the current policy environment
Community-based monitoring committees (CBMC)
In order to ensure that the program reaches the poor and vulnerable, and optimize
the use of public resources, the Government passed Decree no. 794/2018 to
establish CBMC. The rationale was to engage local communities in ensuring the
transparency of efficient resource management, monitoring the quality of social
services, and accountability of groups that violate the rules of social justice.
Committees have 13 members from diverse backgrounds, including: 2 female
community leaders, 2 NGO representatives, a rural female leader, president of
the Social Unit, a male community leader, a youth leadership representative,
an Imam, priest, a health center representative, and a school representative.
Members were selected by the Social Unit Manager and the Local Development
Manager.
While the Government Decree laid out several roles and responsibilities of
CMBC, only three of them seem to be in effect: a) ensuring that only the deserving
beneficiaries receive cash transfers and that undeserving ones with
unregistered or hidden assets are excluded from the program, b) promoting the
program to community members, and c) providing support to community members
who wish to apply to the program.
To date, 120 beneficiaries were disqualified from receiving assistance because
community monitors identified them misreporting their income, which is considered
a success by the committee, ministry and involved official stakeholders.
The community monitors have also been able to alter the behavior of some
beneficiaries out of concerns that their hidden sources of income could be
discovered. While it was not predicted for monitoring to be efficient in tribal
communities -given their cultural ties and weaker governance systems- the
committees have shown some success in filtering out unqualified beneficiaries.
The secret was the community monitors approaching the issue from a religious
perspective, which resonates well with the applicants’ culture.
On the administrative level, community monitors indicated that other concerned
ministries were not cooperative, making their job harder. They are also faced
with some challenges at the community level. They are being physically attacked
by beneficiaries whose cash has been stopped or put on hold pending further
investigations. Generally speaking, community members are perceived as
government informants who are fishing for information about community members
to disqualify them from joining the program. This creates tension between
different members of the community.
It is evident that monitoring committees are operating within a culture of mutual
mistrust, which usually does not breed effective results. Community members
are also not efficiently engaged in the program; they are merely informed of
what the program is and who is to be monitored.
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Problem Statement
The community monitoring committees are not effective due to low community
engagement and acceptance. Community members need to be more aware of
the role and importance of CBMC in the cash transfer programs. Transparency
and effectiveness of the monitoring process are key factors for people acceptance
of CMBC and the success of the whole program.

Stakeholders Analysis
Many stakeholders are involved in the problem of the community monitoring
committees and their effects on targeting the citizens (Annex 1). Using the
power interest grid to analyze the stakeholders according to their interest in the
program and their power represented in the involvement in the decision-making
process, It is evident that the beneficiaries are the ones with the most interest
in the program but with the least power. Also the community committee members
have higher power than the beneficiaries but is still considered a low power as
well. This needs to be changed, increasing the power of the committees is required in
order to lead the change. In addition, more efforts should be exerted in using
the media to promote the program throughout Egypt. The MoSS has the highest
interest and highest power, so the senior management needs to be more
convinced with the importance of the role of the community committees in
achieving the project’s objectives (See Annex 1).

III. Policy Options / Alternatives Analysis
Alternative 1: Changing the structure of the committee to include elected and
appointed members.
In order for the committee to be more accepted in the community and more
representative for the surrounding beneficiaries, part of the committee needs to
be elected by the citizens of that village. Currently the members who make up
the committee are all appointed by both the Local Development Unit Manager
and the Social Unit Manager. This current structure is facing many challenges
in being accepted by the community as they are perceived as spies who get
people out of the program. If the structure of the committee changes to include
fixed members who are the ministry employees and rotating members who are
elected by the community to serve on that committee instead of being appointed,
that would lead to higher community acceptance as the citizens will be the
ones who have elected the community members they can trust. Also, during the
elections, the role of the committee will be advertised leading to an increased
awareness of the committee’s roles and importance. In addition to that, after
the members get elected, it will be their responsibility to conduct awareness
sessions to their communities to inform the beneficiaries of the program
criteria and its condition leading to an increased transparency. In addition, two
active citizens from the community can attend during the committee meetings
to observe how the committee operates and the mechanisms they use to make
decisions.
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This changed structure will lead to better targeting as the elected community
members will be more aware of their communities. It will lead, as well, to better
community acceptance as the processes will become more transparent and it
could lead to more volunteers applying to support the committees as they will
be better known by the community.

Alternative 2: Building capacities of the committees to effectively deliver
quality monitoring experience.
Enhancing the capacities of committees to effectively deliver high quality services
is crucial to avoid any existing gaps between the program’s monitoring needs
and the available personnel’s qualifications. Building capacities could be done
through strengthening their knowledge, continuous monitoring and evaluation of
their results and improving their coordination and communication with the ministry.
Relying only on the committees’ local information and background about
beneficiaries is likely to result in biased decisions that are highly unwanted in the
program. Accordingly, providing the committees with additional training packages
to enrich their core skills would be a requirement. Some skills are necessarily
developed as requirements for effective monitoring including basic monitoring
and accountability concepts, familiarity with qualitative and quantitative
data collection approaches, data analysis and interpretation, identifying results,
reporting, and ethical issues. In addition, TOT trainings, analytical, communication
and leadership skills should be considered to help the committee members
communicate with the different stakeholders to deliver the highest impact results.
Community education and outreach training on how to conduct awareness
sessions and reach out to community members will be included. These trainings
will provide the committees with the skills and competencies that are particularly
important for the process as they will develop their ability to manipulate the
process and ask questions in a non-judgmental manner in order to get the
real answers without putting pressure on the recipient or beneficiary. They can
also develop their ability to collect data from uncommon resources, follow the
patterns and analyze the data accurately. A very important aspect, as well, is
coaching, the ministry should appoint one trainer to 5 governorates who can
attend the meetings to coach the members on how to make decisions and work
as a team.
Although acquiring these skills requires considerable capacity building efforts,
establishing fixed guidelines for the process is a major determinant for
developing appropriate capacities. Apart from the personal knowledge and
individual efforts that are currently used by the committees, the ministry should
provide them with clear guidelines to be followed in the monitoring procedures.
The purpose of these guidelines is to support the committees and eliminate
any individual bias. Moreover, the ministry should have a role in the monitoring
process to increase the transparency of the program and overcome conflicts.
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The work of the committees should be monitored through either a one-level direct
reporting to the ministry or a two-level process where the local directorates review
the reports before sending them to the ministry. The two-level approach is more
practical to avoid time hindrance.
This alternative will lead to improving the quality of services, enhancing the
targeting process with decreased biased decisions. It will also promote the
program outreach as the committee members and local authorities will help in
increasing people awareness. The ministry role, as well, will benefit the procedure
by increasing transparency for the best outcomes.

Alternative 3: Expanding the scope of committees and giving them recognition
Community monitoring groups can have a much larger role to play in o rder
to ensure that resources and government budget are effectively u
 tilized, and
community members are receiving quality services. It is already laid out in
the project documents that one of the responsibilities o f the committees is to
monitor the performance of public service providers, yet this does not seem to
materialize. It could be the case that families are not sending their children to
school because of the poor quality of education, inadequacy of the buildings, or
remoteness of their homes to school locations. It is also possible that children
are not being treated from illnesses because of the lack of adequate healthcare
services in their neighborhood or expensiveness of services. Such issues a re
crucial to tackle in order to make sure the project reaches its end goal. They
should be understood to avoid unfairly excluding p
 articipants because they do
not fulfill the project conditions. Therefore, expanding the scope of the committees’
work to monitor the adequacy of public services provides essential context that,
if responded to e ffectively, will put resources to their best use.
One of the pitfalls of the program, as explained by community members, is that
the same modality is applied all over the country, therefore, does not account for
cultural differences. They noted that education does not mean formal schooling
to all communities, so ‘forcing’ families to send their children to school would
not benefit the children - quite the contrary; it may even exacerbate existing
problems. Some communities also have other means of health care (ex. herbal
medicine) and therefore do not see the necessity of going to a hospital except
in cases of e mergency. Community members also indicated that cash may not
be the best modality for their context, as they would rather receive livelihood
support that has more long-lasting impact, such as raising livestock which their
families had been practicing for decades. This is where community monitors
may very well fit given that they are from the c ommunity itself and understand
all the nuances. By building on the c ommunity knowledge and relationships,
they can identify how different mechanisms that fit the local context can be
applied in order to reach the intended program goals. Also, the beneficiaries
with the committee can form different partnerships with local NGOs to support
services such as livelihood training as the case in El Salvador.
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Another challenge to program implementation and monitoring is that it is based
on state law which is overridden by the customary laws of different cultures
and tribes. By having community members impose statutory laws on their own
communities, social structures and bonds may be a ffected beyond repair
although both parties are well meaning. This is n
 ot to say that state law should
be ignored, but rather that it should work in coordination, not conflict, with
customary laws so that the social bonds remain u
 naffected. This means that
instead of strictly following the program r ules of reporting cases of undeserving
beneficiaries, it may prove its effectiveness to let each community handle the
issue based on their own n
 orms. For example, monitors could choose to speak
with such identified individuals on a friendly basis and get them to withdraw
from the p
 rogram by their own will. 
Another area that needs the attention of the committee is raising the awareness
of the community about the program and who the intended b
 eneficiaries are.
Community members do not seem to understand who s hould be applying for
the program and how, therefore, committee members need to spend more time
educating community members about the program. Awareness sessions do not
have to take very formal forms (such as town hall meetings), but can be very
informal and small scale v ia household visits, leaflet distribution in areas where
communities are literate, or any other form that fits the context.
To guarantee effective work of the committees and maintain their success after
expanding the scope, incentives are needed to motivate committee members
to achieve the best outcomes. Moral incentives, such as giving recognition, are
the most suitable in this case, to enhance their social status in the community
and avoid problematic competition on material benefits. This could be done
through holding conferences to promote their role or giving rotatory certificates
to the best achieving committees.
This alternative will make it clear to c ommunity members that the monitoring
committees have the community’s interest at heart as opposed to being ‘spies’
telling on people who do not d
 eserve receiving cash transfers. Thus, trust
between both parties will be strengthened and natural selection will likely happen.
This implies that when mutual trust exists, community members who deserve
to receive the transfers will apply to the program. 

Alternative 1: Changing the structure of the committee to include elected
and appointed members.
Advantages

Higher transparency, higher community acceptance,
better outreach and targeting of beneficiaries.

Disadvantages

The elections could lead to appoint biased
individuals to certain families or groups of
beneficiaries. Ror example, people can vote for
a member whom they know would give more
opportunities to their families.
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Constraints

The money needed to do the elections.

Political Feasibility

It is politically feasible but there could be the
problem of the acceptance of the ministry officials
to have elected members that they did not choose
themselves.

Alternative 2: Building capacities of the committees to effectively deliver
quality monitoring experience
-Wider outreach to beneficiaries and easier access
and handling information
Advantages

-Better communication with the committee members
and between the committee and MoSS and other
stakeholders that results in better services and
outcome.
-Providing training for the existing committees will
cost money and takes longer time

Disadvantages

-The outcome of the alternative is not highly
guaranteed as the turn-over in the committee
members is considered high in addition to the low
activity of some existing members.
-Bureaucracy in organizing the trainings and the
collaboration with MoSS

Constraints

Political Feasibility

-Trainers or coaches must be very active
-The ministry’s inability to allocate extra funds
for organizing more training or workshops for the
committees
This alternative requires a long-term investment
in the process of preparing the committees which
depends on the ability of MoSS to allocate additional
funds for the preparation of committees. The
alternative could be feasible if the training will be
provided through a volunteering organization or
authority which will require only a small budget from
MoSS to organize the process.

15

Community Monitoring and Evaluation: A Case Study of Takaful and Karama

Alternative 3: Expanding the scope of committees and giving them
recognition

Advantages

Disadvantages

- Effective utilization of resources
- Increased sense of ownership of community
members
- Social structures are preserved
- Community members receive high quality services
- Longer-term impact on community members
- Does not require an additional budget
- Building trust is a lengthy process
- Difficulty in monitoring the performance of different
modalities across the country

Constraints

The government might not have the capacity to
introduce different project modalities in different
governorates.

Political Feasibility

It might not be politically feasible for the government
to implement different modalities. It is also
questionable whether it would be accepted to give
voice and power to community members.

Criteria and Decision Rules
Several integral criteria were put into place to measure the most suitable
alternative (Annex 2). These criteria included economic criteria represented
in the least cost for the government, equity criteria on whether the alternative
is accessible to all governorates and is accessible to poorer women, technical
criteria such as the effectiveness of the alternative, and finally administrative
criteria to measure if the alternative needs high human resources.
A constraint to the first alternative is its applicability as it might not be accepted by
the ministry to have elected members in the committees. It is feasible politically
if it is under the supervision of the government and MoSS, but the unguaranteed
outcomes might not be worth the required money and efforts.
The drawback of the second alternative is the limited financial resources, as
training will require extra organization and budget. It is politically feasible but
the high cost of implementation will make it unfavorable.
The third alternative may have difficulty in being accepted by the decision makers as
it will increase the power of the committees. However, being the least expensive
and the one complying with international recommendations would be advantageous.
It could be, as well, done stepwise to avoid any unaccepted results and
persuade the decision makers.
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In conclusion, the third alternative is the most recommended one due to its
high potential to increase community engagement and acceptance and thus improve
the targeting of citizens. Second, it is economically feasible as it doesn’t impose
further expenditures on the government. Third, it is technically feasible and
does not require the ministry to hire new staff to implement the alternative. It
will be able to manage the root causes of the problem to achieve better results
in the long term.

IV. Conclusion and Recommendations
Over the past years, governments in the developing countries have increased
their investment in the cash transfer programs to reduce poverty as cash transfers
proved to contribute directly to development outcomes. The cash transfer
income is mainly given to help households to sustain their consumption of
daily needs and expenditures on food, education and health services. In Egypt,
MoSS has implemented the Takaful and Karama program that contains in par
a conditional cash transfer model and another unconditional model for specific
cases.
The most important lessons learnt from other countries is the importance of
having partnerships with different NGOs to provide complimentary services to
the citizens such as the case in El Salvador and from Bolsa Familia in Brazil.
Takafol and Karama needs to increase the coverage and reach more people.
Also, Takafol and Karama needs to increase the monitoring and evaluation of
the program to ensure continuous improvement. In addition to that, Takafol
and Karama needs to improve the communication with the local communities
through community leaders to make sure that they know how to apply and what
are the conditions of the program.
On a positive note, the Takaful and Karama program has shown great success
in reducing poverty among participants. However, it faced some challenges
including the proper targeting of vulnerable people, the monitoring of participants’
data especially for the conditional model and the difficulty of measuring the
impact of conditionality due to different factors.
MoSS has adopted a community-based monitoring system to review and monitor
the targeting process, collect the unreported data and eliminate any undeserved
recipient. The committees showed great success in eliminating the undeserved
cases and hence, saving money for the ministry. Yet, the role of these
committees is unaccepted by people together with the challenges they face
which hinder their work.
Three policy alternatives have been discussed as options for policy makers to
adopt, each of them outlined a challenge with the possible solution and expected
outcome. The first alternative suggested incorporating elected members into
the committees to increase people’s acceptance and improve outcomes. The
alternative is expected to be endorsed by people and civil agencies but it needs
difficult mechanisms to persuade the ministry to change the structure of

17

Community Monitoring and Evaluation: A Case Study of Takaful and Karama

committees plus the issue of consuming time.
The second policy alternative addresses the committee members themselves by
focusing on improving their skills and building their capacities to deliver their
best quality services. This option is very expensive and will take a longer time-frame
which is a main constraint.
The third and recommended policy is expanding the scope of committees because
it has the highest potential of achieving the program’s end goal while ensuring
that communities have adequate access to quality health and education services.
This option might face some political hindrance but it could be overcome by
making implementation gradual.

Implementation Strategy
Community engagement is a lengthy process that does not happen overnight
and needs to be introduced in steps in order to be easily managed. Therefore,
the first step would be to bring into effect the public service monitoring role
of community monitoring committees outlined in the program documents. A
major part of the committees’ role would be to monitor whether schools and
health facilities in the village are functioning properly and have all the needed
facilities. At this step, the committee will also work on raising the awareness of
community members about the program and who the beneficiaries should be so
as to target the right people.
As a second step, committees will explore further factors that hinder the
community’s access to education and healthcare (such as location of facilities,
cultural beliefs, or communal practices), thus disqualifying undeserving
beneficiaries from continuing to be in the program. This will possibly result in
suggested changes to the current service delivery mechanisms. Awareness
sessions will continue taking place throughout this phase.
Thirdly, the committees -together with community members- will explore and
suggest different modalities that would reflect more positively on the economic
and social status of the vulnerable. Through an increased sense of ownership
and responsibility, together with more awareness about who the target
beneficiaries are, those who do not fulfill the selection criteria will likely refrain
from applying to the program. There is anecdotal evidence to show that when
community members see the fruits of their efforts, they are more likely to work
for the benefit of other less advantaged members.
While implementing these steps, it is important for committee members to
avoid clashes with communities by finding an alternative to reporting the case
directly to the ministry and working with existing power structures in the
community to explore ways of getting undeserving beneficiaries to withdraw
from the program.
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Monitoring & Evaluation Plan
Community monitors will perform quarterly monitoring of schools and healthcare
facilities to report on the availability and quality of such services. A phone
number could be dedicated to inquiries about the program and complaints. To
measure the effectiveness of awareness raising activities, those who apply for
the program will be asked how they heard about it. Numbers of applicants will
be measured and compared over time. Poverty levels will also be measured and
longitudinally compared. Changes in schooling and healthcare services will be
measured as well on a quarterly basis.

Limitations
The suggested process is lengthy and requires patience for results to materialize.
Limitations might be imposed by governmental agencies who do not have the
capacity to implement different programs in different communities.

Recommendations
In order to have a bigger impact on poverty alleviation, it is recommended to increase
the amount of assistance given to families to help them meet their basic needs
and lift them above the poverty line. It is also recommended to increase the
reach of the program and cover more beneficiaries so as to have a higher impact
at the national level.
There are many players in the development sector offering a wide range of services
to the less advantaged. Therefore, it is advisable for the ministry to form
partnerships with these players in order to offer complementary services to the
program beneficiaries. In addition, it would be useful to establish a unified
database of beneficiaries and their data to be used across different governmental
programs and with non-governmental partners to facilitate targeting and
complementarity.
Because Takaful and Karama involve more than one ministry (MoSS, MoH and
MoE), it is important that clear communication channels are set to facilitate
coordination between them. It is recommended that this role is assigned to a
dedicated coordinator in each of the concerned ministries.
The importance of open communication and feedback collection cannot be
stressed enough for the success of any program. It is, therefore, important for
the ministry to collect feedback from both community and committee members
in order to improve the program, consider feedback in future programming of
similar programs, and improve the role and performance of committees.
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VI. Annex:
Annex 1: Stakeholders Analysis

Annex 2: Criteria analysis
No.

Criteria

Sub Criteria

1st
2nd
3rd
Alternative Alternative Alternative

1

Economic

Less Government
Cost

Moderate

Low

High

2

Equity

Accessibility to all
Citizens

High

Moderate

High

Reaching Ultra-poor High
Citizens

Moderate

High

Technological
Feasibility

High

High

High

Moderate

Low

High

3

Technical

4

Administrative Sufficient Ministry
Staff
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